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EVIDENCE
I. EXPERT TESTIMONY-FORENSIC ODONTOLOGY
AND BITE-MARK EVIDENCE
In State v. Jones," the South Carolina Supreme Court up-
held the admissibility of expert bite-mark testimony against a
criminal defendant. The court held that the admissibility of
such expert testimony "is a matter within the discretion of the
trial court"2 and that such discretion had not been abused.
The case arose from the abduction, rape, robbery, and crim-
inal assault s of a nineteen-year-old woman. In the course of the
attack, the victim was bitten on her breasts. The injuries were
subsequently photographed and comparisons were made be-
tween the life-size photographs and dental impressions taken of
the defendants.4 At trial, testimony was received from the pa-
thology photographer,5 the prosthodontist who prepared the
plaster dental impressions, 6 and a forensic odontologist who ex-
amined the bite marks and compared the photographs with the
impressions.7 The odontologist testified that the impressions
taken from appellant Jones "unquestionably match the bites
and their marks in all aspects, all thirty-seven aspects, that are
present on [the photographs]." 8
Appellants argued that the bite-mark evidence should not
1. - S.C. -, 259 S.E.2d 120 (1979).
2. Id. at -, 259 S.E.2d at 124.
3. Two assailants had kidnapped the woman at knife-point and transported her to a
secluded area where she was battered, sexually assaulted, and robbed; her assailants also
slashed her throat with a knife. Id. at _, 259 S.E.2d at 122.
4. Photographing bite marks of crime victims at the pre-trial investigative stage of
the criminal justice process for comparison with dentition impressions of suspects is a
recognized and widely-practiced procedure among law enforcement agencies and forensic
specialists. See generally A. FATTEH, HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PATHOLOGY 43 (1973); .
GLADFELTER, DENTAL EVIDENCE: A HANDBOOK FOR POLICE 31-47 (1975); L. LUNTZ & P.
LUNTz, HANDBOOK FOR DENTAL IDENTIFICATION 148-62 (1973); I. SOPHER, FORENSIC DEN-
TISTRY 125-52 (1976). For obvious reasons, admissibility in court is governed by stricter
standards.
5. Record, vol. 1, at 356-77.
6. Id. at 377-84, 428-39.
7. Id. at 385-419, 439-87.
8. - S.C. at -, 259 S.E.2d at 125.
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have been admitted. That conclusion, they urged, was consistent
with Frye v. United Statese -the seminal case concerning the
admissibility of scientific evidence. 10 Frye held that systolic
blood pressure deception (lie detector) test results should not be
admitted into evidence. The court in Frye noted that "while
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently estab-
lished to have gained general acceptance in the particular field
in which it belongs.""
Indeed, the discipline of comparative bite-mark analysis is
in its infancy. 12 The South Carolina Supreme Court, however,
did not require a strict application of the Frye standard. Rather,
the court adopted an admissibility standard that had been an-
nounced by a California intermediate appellate court in People
v. Marx,"5 a case also involving bite-mark evidence.1' The court
9. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
10. See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 203 (2d
ed. 1972). See also Boyce, Judicial Recognition of Scientific Evidence in Criminal
Cases, 8 UTAH L. REV. 313 (1962-64); Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1. In the federal courts, the use of expert testi-
mony is governed by rules 702 and 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
FED. R. EvID. 702.
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the par-
ticular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 703.
11. 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added). The original statement of the Frye standard
can provoke some semantic quibbling. "Particular field," under most modem interpreta-
tions, is considered the equivalent of "specialty." For example, when a new technique is
regarded as epistemologically within the purview of "medical science," it need not be
accepted by, or even known to, the average physician in order to be held admissible
under Frye. It is sufficient that some smaller specialty or sub-discipline recognizes the
reliability of the technique. A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAu, ScriNnxic EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
CASEs 5-6 (2d ed. 1978). "The Frye test, however, remains the basic and primary test
upon which courts often rely to either admit or reject testimony based on the results of
novel techniques. 'General acceptance' of a technique in the field in which it belongs is
still the favorite test for admissibility." Id. at 6 (footnotes omitted).
12. See text accompanying notes 72-74 infra.
13. 54 Cal. App. 3d 100, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1975).
14. In Marx, defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. The victim, an
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [], Art. 9
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol32/iss1/9
EVIDENCE
in Marx acknowledged that the usual test for admissibility of
scientific evidence is the Frye standard,15 but noted that the ba-
sis for that standard is found "in the degree to which the trier of
fact must accept, on faith, scientific hypotheses not capable of
proof or disproof in court and not even generally accepted
outside the courtroom."" 6 The court distinguished the lie detec-
tor evidence at issue in Frye and similar types of evidence that
require "total reliance [by the trier of fact] on the expert's as-
sumptions"'" from the evidence resulting from comparative den-
tition studies:
What is significantly different about the evidence in this
case is this: the trier of fact, here the court, was shown models,
photographs, X-rays and dozens of slides of the victim's
wounds and defendant's teeth. It could see what we have seen
in reviewing the exhibits to determine the admissibility of the
evidence.... In short, in admitting the evidence, the court
did not have to sacrifice its independence and common sense in
evaluating it.18
Under the foregoing analysis, the court in Marx ruled the bite-
mark evidence admissible and held that the extent to which the
principles undergirding the testimony lack general scientific ac-
ceptance affects merely the weight given that evidence by the
court.19
The analysis by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Jones
closely parallels that of the California court in Marx. Because
the bite-mark evidence was directly and graphically presented
before the jury, the jury was not compelled to accept on faith
alone the hypotheses upon which the expert witnesses relied.
The court reasoned, therefore, that the rigorous Frye standard
elderly woman, died of manual strangulation. An "eliptical laceration of the nose," be-
lieved by the coroner to be teeth marks, was also observed. There was also evidence of
post-mortem mutilation. Pursuant to a lawfully executed warrant, a cast was taken of
defendant's teeth and compared with a cast of the bite mark on the woman's nose. Three
expert witnesses testified at trial that the injury to the victim's nose was caused by de-
fendant's teeth. Id. at 103-06, 106 n.5, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 351-53, 353 n.5.
15. Id. at 109, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
16. Id. at 110, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 355-56.
17. Id. at 110, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
18. Id. at 111, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
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was inapposite. 20 Thus, admission of expert testimony concern-
ing bite marks was within the discretion of the trial court.2 1
The court's ruling in Jones is troubling for several reasons.
The admissibility of expert testimony is, as the court indicated,
a matter within the trial court's discretion. When considering
the admissibility of evidence based on novel scientific theories,
however, the more reasoned approach has been for the trial
court to defer to the views of the scientific community.2 2 Addi-
tionally, the doctrinal reformulation of the Frye standard by the
court arguably represents a significant departure from control-
ling precedent.23 Moreover, the cases from other jurisdictions
cited by the court as authority for not applying the rigid re-
quirements of Frye either appear, on close examination, to ad-
dress evidentiary issues more limited in scope than the issue
presented in Jones or, for other reasons, seem analytically un-
helpful.24 Finally, expert bite-mark testimony does not appear to
meet the Frye standard.25 A continued departure from that
threshhold standard of admissibility may well entail the admis-
sion of irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence in future crimi-
nal proceedings.2  The admissibility of expert testimony is
largely a matter of judicial discretion in South Carolina,27 as in
most jurisdictions.28 The general rule, however, does not satis-
20. - S.C. at -, 259 S.E.2d at 124.
21. Id. (citing Prince v. Associated Petroleum Carriers, 262 S.C. 358, 204 S.E.2d 575
(1974)).
22. See text accompanying notes 27-33 infra.
23. See text accompanying notes 34-42 infra.
24. See notes 43-71 and accompanying text infra.
25. See notes 72-74 and accompanying text infra.
26. See notes 75-77 and accompanying text infra.
27. - S.C. at -, 259 S.E.2d at 124 (citing Prince v. Associated Petroleum Carri-
ers, 262 S.C. 358, 204 S.E.2d 575 (1974)); W. REISER, A COMPARISON OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE WITH SOUTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE LAW 31-32 (1976):
The law in South Carolina is essentially the same as the Federal Rule. The
South Carolina cases stress the fact that the "adequacy of a witness's qualifica-
tions as an expert is largely a matter of discretion for the trial judge." Redman
o. Ford Motor Co., 253 S.C. 266, 170 S.E.2d 207 (1969). "Whether the inquiry
was one upon which expert testimony was proper" is also within the discretion
of the trial court. Jenkins v. Long Motor Lines, 233 S.C. 87, 103 S.E.2d 523
(1958).
See FED. R. EVID. 702, supra note 10.
28. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 13, at 29-31. Whether "the subject of the infer-
ence must be so distinctively related to some science, profession, business or occupation
as to be beyond the ken of the average layman" is in some courts a matter of judicial
122 [Vol. 32
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factorily resolve the evidentiary problems raised when testimony
is elicited from one who is an expert, but whose field of expertise
is postulated on largely unsubstantiated theories that have been
subject to considerable controversy.
Dean McCormick described three distinct levels of analysis
relative to the admissibility of expert testimony. The role of ju-
dicial discretion varies significantly at each level. First, in some
jurisdictions, including South Carolina,29 expert testimony is ad-
missible upon a judicial determination that the factual issue in
dispute is beyond the ken of the average juror's understanding."0
Other jurisdictions admit expert testimony when an expert's
view would be helpful.3 1 Second, assuming that some variety of
expert testimony is, as a general matter, appropriate for any
given issue, whether a particular individual qualifies as an expert
on that matter is "recognized as a matter for the trial judge's
discretion reviewable only for abuse. '3 2 Finally, expert testimony
must be excluded if "the state of the pertinent art or scientific
knowledge does not permit a reasonable opinion to be asserted
even by an expert."' 3 It is at this level that the Frye doctrine
limits absolute judicial discretion with a well-reasoned deference
to the community of scientific experts.
A standard substantially like the one in Frye has been
adopted in South Carolina, at least with respect to evidence re-
garding the administration and results of lie detector tests."
In new areas of scientific development ... the courts may re-
quire more than some supporting evidence of the soundness of
the underlying scientific theory before they admit testimony as
to conclusions which flow from it. The early attempts to intro-
duce the results of lie detector tests were rebuffed by the
courts on the ground that the scientific principle involved has
not passed beyond the experimental stage and had not "re-
discretion. Id. at 29 (footnotes omitted). "[O]ther courts will admit expert opinion con-
cerning matters about which the jurors may have general knowledge if the expert opinion
would still aid their understanding of the fact issue." Id. at 30 (footnotes omitted).
29. Id. at 30.
30. See note 26 supra.
31. C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 10, § 13, at 30. See note 28 supra.
32. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 13, at 30 (footnotes omitted).
33. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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ceived general scientific acceptance."3 5
This past year in State v. McGuire, 3  the supreme court reaf-
firmed its commitment to this principle.
37
The utility3s of Frye is sacrificed by analyses proffering
forced distinctions between polygraph test results and other
forms of expert testimony equally predicated on germinal scien-
tific theories.39 A jury would clearly have to accept on faith alone
the hypotheses relied upon by polygraph experts; 0 it is ques-
tionable whether the jury's first-hand observation of bite-mark
evidence, including slides, films, models, X-rays, and accompa-
nying detailed narration by the expert, will enable it to "weigh"
such expert testimony any more critically. Indeed, the very ra-
tionale for admitting expert testimony in the first place4' belies
that assumption. To concede that the resolution of a particular
factual dispute is beyond the scope of the ordinary juror's un-
35. J. DREHER, A GUIDE TO EVIDENCE LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA 58-59 (rev. ed. J.
Thames 1979).
36. 272 S.C. 547, 253 S.E.2d 103 (1979).
37. Id. at 551, 253 S.E.2d at 105. The continued vitality of the Frye standard in
South Carolina is evidenced in United States v. Grant, 473 F. Supp. 720 (D.S.C. 1979), in
which Judge Hemphill observed:
This court finds no reason to try an issue, ordinarily the responsibility of a
jury, by use of a polygraph. In Frye v. United States .... the first reported
federal case on polygraph admissibility, the court stated the appropriate stan-
dard for the judicial determination of whether to use newly developed scien-
tific and experimental evidence should be whether the scientific principle or
discovery is "sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs." . . . This court would proceed with cau-
tion on the basis of Frye.
Id. at 723. Judge Hemphill also observed that "South Carolina by way of dicta, has indi-
cated in State v. Britt [see note 33 supra] . . . , that lie detector (the same as polygraph)
tests should not be accepted ... " 473 F. Supp. at 725.
38. In addition to providing a sound basis on which to decide the admissibility of
novel scientific evidence, the Frye standard serves other policy interests: "The Frye test,
if applied conscientiously, also assures the defendant greater access to rebuttal experts
and makes the 'battle of the experts' less uneven. Until other methods are developed to
redress the imbalance in resources between prosecution and defense, courts should con-
tinue to apply the Frye standard." Comment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 875, 885 (1979).
39. See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
40. See text accompanying notes 15 & 16 supra.
41. See text accompanying notes 29 & 30 supra. But cf. text accompanying note 31
supra. In those jurisdictions in which expert testimony is admitted when merely helpful,
the distinction noted between bite-mark evidence and polygraph test results would ap-
pear more meaningful. The concerns for relevancy and reliability in the face of prejudice
and needless jury misapprehension weigh strongly against admissibility nonetheless. See
generally notes 72-77 and accompanying text infra..
6
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derstanding, and thus, to rely on the opinions of experts, is to
admit the inability of that jury to. perceive defects in the ex-
perts' reasoning or flaws in their substantive findings.42
The supreme court cited cases from four jurisdic-
tions-Illinois, 4 Indiana,44 Texas, 45 and California 48-in which
the admissibility of bite-mark evidence was upheld. These cases,
however, for a variety of reasons are not persuasive. The court
relied principally on Marx,47 the California case, particularly for
the rationale it provided for not applying the Frye standard to
bite-mark evidence.48 The Marx approach to admissibility of ex-
pert testimony, however, analytical flaws aside,49 is not the gen-
eral law in California. Within several months of the appellate
court's decision in Marx, the California Supreme Court in Peo-
ple v. Kelly,50 without expressly condemning the decision in
Marx, offered a resounding and cogent reaffirmation of the vital-
ity of the Frye standard in California:
42. Where scientific evidence is involved, . . . the trier of fact often cannot re-
alistically be viewed as possessing the capacity to evaluate the reliability of
specific data gathered by scientific means, to supply a general proposition by
which the significance of the data may be seen, or to apply such a proposition
correctly. Therefore, various requirements which must be met before scientific
evidence is admitted should be, and largely are, designed to compensate for
these inadequacies of the trier of fact.
Strong, supra note 10, at 4.
43. People v. Milone, 43 IlM. App. 3d 385, 356 N.E.2d 1350 (1976).
44. Neihaus v. State, 265 Ind. 655, 359 N.E.2d 513, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977).
45. Patterson v. State, 509 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
46. People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d 100, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1975).
47. Id.
48. Marx distinguished between two varieties of "novel" expert testimony. The first,
which includes polygraph evidence, requires the jury to presume the validity of the ex-
perts' testing methods and theories. The other variety, although still "expert," provides a
clear exposition of methodology and substantive finding for the jury's evaluation. In
Marx, the court thought bite-mark evidence properly belonged in the latter category;
such evidence need not meet the Frye standard. See text accompanying notes 13-21
supra.
49. See text accompanying notes 39-41 supra.
50. 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976). Kelly held that expert
testimony based on spectrographic analysis technique of speaker identification, com-
monly called "voiceprints," did not meet the Frye standard and was, therefore, inadmis-
sible. Arguably, the exclusion is consistent with the distinction drawn by Marx between
the two different varieties of expert testimony, with voiceprints being similar to
polygraphs; the California Supreme Court, however, made no such distinction in its opin-
ion. Indeed, the court's discussion expressly addressed "novel method[s] of proof" and
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We have expressly adopted the. . .Frye test and Califor-
nia courts, when faced with a novel method of proof, have re-
quired a preliminary showing of general acceptance of the new
technique in the relevant scientific community. . . .Some crit-
icism has been directed at the Frye standard, primarily on the
ground that the test is too conservative, often resulting in the
prevention of the admission of relevant evidence . . .. [W]e
are satisfied that there is ample justification for the exercise of
considerable judicial caution in the acceptance of evidence de-
veloped by new scientific techniques.
Arguably, the admission of such evidence could be left, in
the first instance, to the sound discretion of the trial court, in
which event objections, if any, to the reliability of the evidence
(or of the underlying scientific technique on which its based)
might lessen the weight of the evidence but would not necessa-
rily prevent its admissibility. This has not been the direction
taken by the California courts or by those of most states. Frye,
and the decisions which have followed it, rather than turning
to the trial judge have assigned the task of determining relia-
bility of the evolving technique to members of the scientific
community from which the new method emerges.51
The other cases cited by the court in Jones are equally un-
persuasive. The Texas case, Patterson v. State,52 upheld the ad-
missibility of bite-mark evidence on authority of Doyle v.
State.5 In Doyle, the only issue raised on appeal was the consti-
tutionality of extracting the dentition molds from the suspect
and photographing the suspect's mouth for use in an investiga-
tion.54 Admissibility under Frye or any other related standard
was not addressed in the court's opinion. Patterson also cited
Polk v. State5 5 for the proposition that "objection goes to the
weight rather than to the admissibility."56 That language in
Polk, however, was cast in reference to an objection to the quali-
fications of a particular witness. 57 Once again no issues pertain-
ing to the admissibility of novel scientific evidence were raised.
51. Id. at 31, 549 P.2d at 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (emphasis added; citations
omitted).
52. 509 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
53. 159 Tex. Crim. 310, 263 S.W.2d 779 (1954).
54. Id. at 310, 263 S.E.2d at 779.
55. 500 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
56. 509 S.W.2d at 863.
57. 500 S.W.2d at 826.
[Vol. 32
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The Indiana case cited by the court, Niehaus v. State,5 8 also
is analytically unhelpful. The Indiana Supreme Court, citing no
authority, unequivocally upheld the admissibility of bite-mark
evidence, distinguishing polygraph evidence from bite-mark
evidence:
It is acknowledged that in any given case, unreliable results
may be produced in a polygraph test by influences that cannot
be controlled or compensated for by the examiner. The method
of identification utilized here, however, is simply a matter of




To assert, as the court in Niehaus did, that bite-mark evidence
is more reliable than polygraph evidence is to circumvent the
issue. The ultimate aim is to admit reliable and probative evi-
dence while the immediate goal is to find a test, both workable
and fair, by which reliability can be determined."0 The court did
not address the restrictions and rationale of Frye. 1 Rather, it
referred, quite perfunctorily, to the role of judicial discretion in
adjudging the admissibility of expert testimony. Again, however,
the discussion was overly broad: the court noted with approval
58. 265 Ind. 655, 359 N.E.2d 513, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977).
59. 265 Ind. at 661, 359 N.E.2d at 516. The court noted: "The methods for making
such comparisons are indeed complex and require skilled technicians to perform, but
they consist of standardized procedures known to procure accurate models and measure-
ments. We see no reason why such evidence should be rejected as unreliable, simply
because it has thus far had limited application." Id.
The procedures followed in Jones were admittedly not "standardized." Record, vol.
1, at 393, 417-18, 483-84. Whether procedures are anywhere "standardized" is also sub-
ject to doubt. Id. See notes 72 & 73 and accompanying text infra.
Furthermore, even if the integrity of dentition casting and odontological photogra-
phy is conceded, there is serious doubt surrounding the second postulate of bite-mark
identification-namely, that dentition is accurately and graphically recorded in human
flesh. See note 74 and accompanying text infra.
60. Error, miscalculation, and misapprehension are, of course, the accepted hazards
of all human inquiry and experimentation. Certainly the findings of a forensic odontolo-
gist may be influenced by factors that he, not being aware of them, could not control or
compensate for. It is precisely because germinal sciences may not yet have exposed
enough of their own pitfalls that judgments about reliability can most reasonably be
made by the most informed segments of the scientific community.
61. The court in Niehaus implied not only that bite-mark evidence is "better" than
polygraph evidence, but that, unlike polygraph evidence, bite-mark evidence is admissi-
ble under the Frye standard. Whether the technique of bite-mark identification has
gained general acceptance in the scientific community, however, can be seriously ques-
tioned. See notes 72-74 and accompanying text infra.
9
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the qualifications of the expert who testified at trial, but ne-
glected the critical subtleties62 that must be considered in deter-
mining the admissibility of expert testimony based on novel sci-
entific theories.
The South Carolina court in Jones also cited People v. Mi-
lone,63 an Illinois case heavily relied upon by the solicitor at
trial,6 4 and by the State on appeal.6 5 In its brief, the State de-
scribed Milone as "the most complete judicially created treatise
on the state of the law in this area."6 Apart from one lower
court case in its own jurisdiction,67 the only authorities cited by
the Illinois court upholding the admissibility of bite-mark evi-
dence were Doyle v. State,' Patterson v. State,69 and People v.
Marx.7 0 The extent to which these cases fail to articulate any
persuasive rationale for admitting expert bite-mark testimony
has been noted.7' It appears from the trial testimony of the
State's forensic odontologist in Jones that bite-mark identifica-
tion procedures, at least at present, do not meet the "general
acceptance" standard imposed by Frye:
Q. Based on your experience, and the number of mouths
and teeth and impressions that you have examined and your
training; do you have any idea about the probability of the
same person having those identical thirty-seven characteristics
in the same arrangement?
A. Well this-we're going to get into a lot of controversy
about-because of the lack of really valid scientific evidence on
bite marks being a relatively new area of forensic medicine as
far as the courts are concerned. The-you could, you could do
statistics on it.
You could do statistics of probability and come up with
thirty-seven independent points, probably representing a figure
somewhere in the billions. That is, as a one in a billion, you
62. The subtleties are summarized in Dean McCormick's treatise, supra note 10,
and are explained in text accompanying notes 29-33 supra.
63. 43 Ill. App. 3d 385, 356 N.E.2d 1350 (1976).
64. Record, vol. 1, at 421.
65. Brief of Respondent at 14-15.
66. Id. at 14.
67. People v. Johnson, 8 Il. App. 3d 457, 289 N.E.2d 722 (1972).
68. 159 Tex. Crim. 310, 263 S.W.2d 779 (1954).
69. 509 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
70. 54 Cal. App. 3d 100, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1975).
71. See text accompanying notes 47-62 supra.
[Vol. 32
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know, type of thing. It is very difficult to apply these statistics
to this particular thing because of a lack of background infor-
mation. But I think that I have never seen any two casts alike.
I have never seen any two mouths alike. I have only done four
bite cases. But those four have not been alike. The literature I
think states that we could probably get a hundred or so bite
cases, none of which have been alike. But we're in the infancy
of this.
72
Indeed, much of the technical literature in the field of bite-mark
identification candidly describes the incipient nature of the
methodology.73 The potential for erroneous findings in bite-mark
analysis has also been noted. 4 Whether the Frye standard is
72. Record, vol. 1, at 402-03.
73. L. LUNTZ & P. LUNTZ, HANDBOOK FOR DENTAL IDENTIFICATION (1973): "Because
dentists have limited experience and background knowledge in the evaluation of bite-
marks, there is, as yet, no systematic approach to the examination and appraisal of a
bite-mark as evidence." Id. at 148. I. SOPHER, FORENSIC DENTISTRY (1976):
The problem of specificity in the bite mark analysis results from the lack
of a scientific core or basic data for comparison. The results of the bite mark
comparison may indicate a perfect or reasonably perfect fit between the bite
mark and a suspect's dentition; however, how can one be absolutely or even
perhaps reasonably certain that no other individual could have produced a par-
ticular bite? Classified bite mark characteristics on large segments of the popu-
lation are unavailable; therefore, an absolute scientific estimation of specificity
regarding the particular bite mark/supsect comparison is not possible. The sit-
uation is comparable to the point in the distant past when the 100th set of
fingerprints was classified. At that time, it was known that the set of prints did
not match the ninety-nine others previously recorded, but it was not known if
the set of prints were [sic] specific for only the one individual fingerprinted.
Today, after categorizing 84 million sets of fingerprints in the United States, it
can be stated with certainty that no two sets match. The present position of
bite mark specificity is comparable to the 100th fingerprint case example. This
is the problem that confronts the dental expert when he ponders the question
of specificity. Due to the fact that the bite mark analyst cannot relate his find-
ings to a classified body of knowledge regarding bite mark analyses, he finds
difficulty in assessing a degree of probability or a realm of reasonable dental
certainty concerning his formal opinion. It is only proper in the pursuit of
truth regarding such important forensic evidence that this point be made clear
to the prosecution, defense and jury. Obviously, however, any particular case
may present unusual arch features which strongly indicate a particular mouth.
Id. at 140. (For an interesting article that, by implication, challenges the presumptive
validity of fingerprint comparisons as they are currently conducted, see Lauritis, Some
Fingerprints Lie, 34 N.L.A.D.A. BRIEFCASE 74 (1977)). See generally Sognnaes, Medical
Progress-Forensic Stomatology, 296 NEW ENG. J. MED. 197 (1977).
74. DeVore, Bite Marks for Identification?-A Preliminary Report, 11 Mhn. SCI. &
L. 144 (1971):
From the complete eccentric distortion in the living human skin due to change
11
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deemed applicable or not, the conspicuous lack of standardized
methodologies and generally accepted postulates in bite-mark
analysis raises critical doubts about the relevancy of bite-mark
of position, and the irregular shrinkage of the excised human skin, it has been
determined that any attempt to make comparison and positive identification of
a bite mark by photographic superimposition, enlargement, or reduction, can-
not be used unless the exact position and conditions of the body at the time
the mark was made is known and duplicated.
Id. at 145; L. LUNTZ & P. LuNTz, HANDBOOK FOR DENTAL IDENTIFICATION (1973):
When the dental evidence is studied, allowance should be made for the
fact that a bite-mark is not an exact reproduction of the mouth because of
tissue changes coincident with, and subsequent to, the bite. Furthermore, be-
cause the entire incisal edge of a tooth may not be situated in the same plane,
the complete incisal edge may not always be reproduced. Those portions of the
incisal edges of the teeth that extend farther than the others will penetrate
more deeply in a bite and produce sharper marks. Teeth situated relatively
high in the plane of occlusion might not produce any marks at all. Usually,
only the anterior teeth and, possibly, the first bicuspids will produce identifi-
able imprints in a bite-mark.
Id. at 153. I. SoPHER, FORENSIC DENTISTRY (1976):
The performance of the autopsy and handling of the body prior to the bite
mark analysis may cause unnecessary artefactual change of the bite mark and
thereby introduce error into the comparison analysis. Immediate action upon
bite mark cases is essential because further post mortem change may lead to
shrinkage or bloating of tissue, the loss of tooth indentations or the futher
diffusion of contusion hemorrhage, thus distorting the original tooth pattern.
Id. at 127.
Interestingly, the potential for error is perhaps graphically illustrated by the circum-
stances surrounding People v. Milone, a case heavily relied upon by the solicitor at trial,
see Record, vol. 1, at 421, and by the State on appeal, see Brief of Respondent at 14-15.
At Milone's bench trial, a leading forensic dentist testified that a bite mark found on the
thigh of Sally Kandel, the murder victim, coincided at 29 points of comparison with the
dentition of Milone. Other dentists testified for the defense and challenged the conclu-
sions of the prosecution's witnesses by pointing out inconsistencies between the mark
and the defendant's dentition. Milone was convicted and the conviction was affirmed.
Milone is serving an 80- to 175-year sentence.
At an annual meeting of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, a group of
forensic odontologists read the evidence from the record of the Milone case and
presented visual evidence. "At the concluson, . . many [forensic scientists] expressed
unabashed astonishment that a fact-finder could possibly have believed that the defen-
dant's identity had been positively established by the bitemark, upon the evidence
presented." A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 16.07,
at 656 n.24 (2d ed. 1978).
Three years after the trial, one of the defense's experts in the Milone case returned
to Illinois to examine a bite mark on another murder victim. Ultimately, the dentist
determined that the mark matched the one discovered on Sally Kandel. A suspect in the
latter murder confessed to the killing of Sally Kandel as well, but subsequently recanted.
Amidst this cloud of confusion, efforts to reopen the Sally Kandel murder case and to
appeal Milone's conviction have failed. Pick, The Root of the Matter, 8 STUDENT LAW.
19, 44 (1980).
12
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*testimony. "[N]either the theory of the uniqueness of each
mouth nor a standard of scientific technique-two indicators of
scientific reliability-has been established. Hence, bite mark evi-
dence may fail to pass the most basic hurdle of relevancy. 75
The potential for undue prejudice to the defendant, at the in-
stance of incriminating bite-mark testimony has also been noted:
Bite mark evidence is more persuasive on the ultimate issue of
guilt than other analogous forms of evidence. For example,
fingerprints tend to be circumstantial or associative; that is,
they rarely decide a case alone, but tend merely to link a de-
fendant to the scene of the crime or an object involved in the
crime. By contrast, bite marks, in the usual case, will be con-
clusive of the guilt issue: the logical distance between the fact
of biting and the ultimate issue of guilt is short. Thus, admis-
sion of irrelevant bite mark evidence may be particularly preju-
dicial to the defendant.7
6
In light of these drawbacks, bite-mark testimony, predi-
cated on novel scientific postulates and methodologies, should be
admitted only pursuant to a strict application of the Frye test.
The California Supreme Court in People v. Kelly observed:
The primary advantage ... of the Frye test lies in its es-
sentially conservative nature. For a variety of reasons, Frye
was deliberately intended to interpose a substantial obstacle to
the unrestrained admission of evidence based upon new scien-
tific principles.... Several reasons founded in logic and com-
mon sense support a posture of judicial caution in this area.
Lay jurors tend to give considerable weight to "scientific" evi-
dence when presented by "experts" with impressive creden-
tials. We have acknowledged the existence of a ". . . mislead-
ing aura of certainty which often envelops a new scientific
process, obscuring its currently experimental nature."7
75. Comment, The Admissibility of Bite Mark Evidence, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 309, 325
(1978). The author cogently notes the flaws of the Marx decision and the attendant dan-
gers of following that court's reasoning. These include not only admission of irrelevant
evidence, id. at 322-25, but risks of undue prejudice to the defendant, id. at 325-27, and
likely difficulties encountered by jurors in assessing bite-mark evidence, id. at 327-29.
The Jones decision in South Carolina suffers from these same drawbacks.
76. Id. at 325-26 (footnotes omitted).
77. 17 Cal. 3d at 31-32, 549 P.2d at 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (citations omitted).
See also United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Comment, supra




Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32
No suggestion is made that bite-mark evidence is hopelessly
unreliable or that it shall forever fall short of admissibility
under Frye. Indeed, if and when the scientific community ac-
cepts the underlying principles of bite-mark analysis and the at-
tendant empirical procedures become reasonably standardized, 8
such testimony will no doubt prove useful to courts and juries.
While the art remains in its infancy, however, the rationale of
Frye and the critical problems relating to relevancy, prejudice,
and jury misapprehension militate strongly against the Jones
rule of admitting such evidence at trial.
II. HEARSAY
A. Declarations Against Penal Interests
In State v. Hayes, 9 the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that a declaration against penal interests does not qualify as an
exception to the hearsay rule in a criminal trial.8 0 Although the
scope of this exception had been left partially undefined by prior
South Carolina cases,8" the rule announced in Hayes appears to
78. One commentator has suggested that the integrity and viability of bite-mark
analysis be assessed by a scientific review committee of forensic odontologists:
The committee's primary functions would be the establishment of a stan-
dard minimum quantum of evidence sufficient for admissibility of bite mark
evidence by determining how many concordant points of similarity are neces-
sary, and by setting uniqueness or quality values for specific points. A subsidi-
ary function of the review committee would be the certification of technically
accurate and easily comprehensible uniform methods of comparison. The sug-
gestion of development of a committee is particularly appropriate in the bite
mark analysis field since international societies convene regularly to discuss
bite marks and their expertise could be utilized.
Representatives of law enforcement professions, such as criminal patholo-
gists, might wish to participate to gain an understanding of the potentialities
of bite mark evidence. Attorney representation on such a committee is proba-
bly not a real need, although forensic dentists who are also attorneys would be
valuable members.
Establishment of a review committee has several distinct advantages. The
committee could resolve any question of fundamental relevancy or probative
value of the evidence. An objective data base would be required to set mini-
mum standards. The committee, therefore, should rely on statistical back-
ground data to make its recommendations. Systematic experimentation would
thus be encouraged. In turn, expert evidence should become less subjective.
Comment, supra note 75, at 331-32.
79. 272 S.C. 256, 250 S.E.2d 342 (1979).
80. Id. at 257, 250 S.E.2d at 342.
81. See cases cited note 82 infra.
14
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depart from the course of well-reasoned doctrinal refinement ini-
tiated in two earlier decisions.82 Moreover, the ruling contrasts
sharply with the modern trend of authority against complete ex-
clusion of declarations against penal interests in criminal trials.83
The appellants in Hayes were convicted of assault and bat-
tery with intent to kill. Although the two cases arose from the
same circumstances and operative facts, they were prosecuted
separately because one appellant was a juvenile. Following the
juvenile proceeding and prior to the older appellant's trial, the
defense counsel learned that two individuals were prepared to
testify that two identified declarants had admitted committing
the act for which the appellants were being tried. Both declar-
ants had since moved out of the state; one of the individuals
signed an affidavit recounting the statements of the two declar-
ants. Counsel for the juvenile produced the affidavit and made a
motion for a new trial on the ground of after-discovered evi-
dence. The motion was denied. Counsel for the older appellant
produced both individuals at trial and attempted to introduce
their testimony regarding the statements made by the two ab-
sent declarants. The prosecution objected and the objection was
sustained. The supreme court affirmed the rulings of both lower
courts.84
The declaration-against-interest exception to the hearsay
rule is well established.8 5 It proceeds from a realization of the
necessity for such evidence as well as an underlying presumption
that the evidence is trustworthy. More specifically, declarations
are not admitted unless the declarant is unavailable to testify;
the hearsay account, therefore, is necessary if the substance of
the statement is to be heard in court at all. e The trustworthi-
82. See McClain v. Anderson Free Press, 232 S.C. 448, 102 S.E.2d 720 (1958); Cole-
man v. Frazier, 38 S.C.L. (4 Rich.) 59 (1850).
83. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 257 N.E.2d 16, 308 N.Y.S.2d 825
(1970); ARIz. R. EVID. 804(b)(3); ARK. R. EVID. 804(b)(3); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.804(2)(c)
(1979); MONT. R. EVID. 804(b)(3); NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.345 (1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 2804(B)(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1979). See generally Note, Declarations Against Pe-
nal Interest: Standards of Admissibility Under an Emerging Majority Rule, 56 B.U.L.
REv. 148 (1975).
84. 272 S.C. at 256, 250 S.E.2d at 342.
85. "This exception may be traced back as early as any of the others [exceptions to
the hearsay rule], namely, to the early 1700s." 5 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §
1455, at 323 (rev. ed. Chadborn 1972). See C. McCoRNUCK, supra note 10, § 279, at 675.
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ness element is derived from the presumption that a statement
against important interests of the declarant would not have been
uttered by him unless he believed it to be true.
8 7
In the course of its common-law development, however, the
declaration-against-interest exception has been curiously lim-
ited. 8 Accordingly, further doctrinal refinement poses an espe-
cially difficult task. Particularly troubling is the traditional limi-
tation that a statement against penal interests, as opposed to
pecuniary or proprietary interests, should not be admitted.89
That distinction, traceable to an early English case," continued
in the American courts which regarded declarations against pe-
nal interests as insufficiently trustworthy on the assumption that
declarants may confess to crimes for reasons other than actual
guilt.8 1 Coleman v. Frazier92 and McClain v. Anderson Free
Press,9 3 two early South Carolina cases that allowed admissibil-
ity of declarations against penal interests in civil trials, indicate,
however, that this illogical limitation94 was not persuasive with
ity Requirement of Declaration Against Interest Hearsay, 55 IOWA L. REV. 477, 478
(1969). But see sources cited note 98 infra.
87. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 85, § 1422.
88. See id. §§ 1455, 1476, 1477.
89. Id. § 1476.
90. Sussex Peerage Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (1844).
91. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 99 Miss. 719, 55 So. 961 (1911)(declarant's confession
to crime for which brother was being charged may have been motivated largely by desire
to exculpate brother).
92. 38 S.C.L. (4 Rich.) 146 (1850).
93. 232 S.C. 448, 102 S.E.2d 750 (1958).
94. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 85, § 1477, at 359.
The only practical consequences of this unreasoning limitation are shock-
ing to the sense of justice; for in its commonest application it requires, in a
criminal trial, the rejection of a confession, however well authenticated, of a
person deceased or insane or fled from the jurisdiction (and therefore quite
unavailable) who has avowed himself to be the true culprit. The absurdity and
wrong of rejecting indiscriminately all such evidence is patent.
Id.
Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913),
was similarly critical of the traditional limitation on declarations against penal interests:
The confession of Joe Dick, since deceased, that he committed the murder for
which the plaintiff in error was tried, coupled with circumstances pointing to
its truth, would have a very strong tendency to make anyone outside of a Court
of justice believe that Donnelly did not commit the crime. I say this, of course,
on the suppositon that it should be proved that the confession really was
made, and that there was no ground for connecting Donnelly with Dick. The
rules of Evidence in the main are based on experience, logic, and common
sense, less hampered by history than some parts of the substantive law. There
16
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the Supreme Court of South Carolina. Most other American ju-
risdictions,95 however, perceived greater force in this distinction.
Not uncommonly, these courts declined to examine the initial
justification for the rule and merely followed its dictate. 6 Al-
though other courts9 7 recognized the view that persons are as
unlikely to utter untruthful declarations against their penal in-
terests as against their pecuniary or proprietary interests, 9 they
excluded declarations against penal interests because of, in Dean
McCormick's words, "the fear of opening a door to a flood of
perjured witnesses falsely testifying to confessions that were
never made."99
The supreme court's decision in Hayes is more interesting
for what it does not say about the precedent for the relevant
hearsay exception than for what it does say. The court summa-
rily ruled that the declarations proffered in the appellants' pro-
ceedings were properly excluded from evidence. 00 Coleman and
McClain were deemed inapposite on the ground that they were
civil cases.1°1
The court's reluctance to articulate the distinction between
civil and criminal proceedings in determining admissibility is of
is no decision by this Court against the admissibility of such a confession; the
English cases since the separation of the two countries do not bind us; the
exception to the hearsay rule in the case of declarations against interest is well
known; no other statement is so much against interest as a confession of mur-
der; it is far more calculated to convince than dying declarations, which would
be let in to hang a man; and when we surround the accused with so many
safeguards, some of which seem to me excessive, I think we ought to give him
the benefit of a fact that, if proved, commonly would have such weight. The
history of the law and the arguments against the English doctrine are so well
and fully stated by Mr. Wigmore that there is no need to set them forth at
greater length.
Id. at 277 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
95. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 85, § 1476, at 349.
96. See Annot., 162 A.L.R. 446, 447 n.5 (1946).
97. See, e.g., Lyon v. State, 22 Ga. 399, 401 (1857).
98. See generally Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An Exception to the
Hearsay Rule, 58 HARV. L. REV. 1, 39 (1944). But see 4 J. WEINSTmIN, WEINSTEIN's Evi-
DENCE I 804(b)(3)[01], at 804-90 (1979): "Persons will lie despite the consequences to
themselves to exculpate those they love or fear, to inculpate those they hate or fear, or
because they are congenital liars. Others will not realize that they are making an admis-
sion against themselves, or will make ambivalent statements susceptible of differing in-
terpretations." Id.
99. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 278, at 674.
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particular concern in light of the thoughtful analysis in the Cole-
man and McClain decisions. In Coleman, a prescient opinion
handed down in 1850, the South Carolina Supreme Court recog-
nized that to the extent that declarations against interests gen-
erally can be presumed trustworthy, so may declarations made
specifically against penal interests. 10 2 Slightly more than a cen-
tury later, the court reaffirmed in McClain that declarations
against penal interests-and the court suggested no limita-
tions-are admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule.103
The conclusion reached in Coleman and McClain is sound. In
both cases, the court astutely recognized the general evidentiary
value of declarations against important interests. In each case,
the deciding court properly left the challenge of effecting advisa-
ble and warranted refinements of the general rule of admissibil-
ity to future cases. The most formidable challenge is posed by
criminal cases. When the consequences of conviction are most
severe, defendant's incentive to procure perjured accounts of
third-party confessions runs strong.
Judicial vigilance on this count is entirely warranted, and
limitations on the admissibility of declarations against interests
may be wholly appropriate when the risk of perjury seems espe-
cially acute. The broadly cast rule excluding such declarations
from all criminal cases-when announced without greater expla-
nation than the court provided in Hayes-is disturbing. The
bold conclusion that declarations against penal interests should
be admissible in civil cases but not in criminal cases suggests
two vastly different analytical processes. Either declarations
against penal interests are inherently trustworthy, but other
concerns require an exception in criminal proceedings, or such
declarations are inherently untrustworthy and the exception ob-
tains in civil proceedings.0 4 The former view could be substan-
102. 38 S.C.L. (4 Rich.) at 153.
103. A majority of three approved of the declaration-against-penal-interests excep-
tion. 232 S.C. at 467, 102 S.E.2d at 760 (Oxner, J., concurring); id. at 468, 102 S.E.2d at
761 (Stukes, C.J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 469, 102 S.E.2d at 761 (Legge, J.,
dissenting). In Carson v. Squirrel Inn Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1040 (D.S.C. 1969), Judge
Hemphill discussed the scope of the declaration-against-penal-interests exception to the
hearsay rule in South Carolina and noted that the exception was approved by three
South Carolina Supreme Court justices in McClain. Id. at 1047.
104. The principal shortcoming of the Hayes decision is its failure to articulate the
basis for the rule it announces. The court's restrictive interpretation of the Coleman and
McClain cases, namely, that those cases have no application to criminal proceedings,
[Vol. 32136
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tially consistent with the precedent of Coleman and McClain;
obscures the significance of those two precedents.
The matrix below sets forth the approaches to the admissibility of declarations
against interests (penal and proprietary or pecuniary) in different proceedings (criminal
and civil).
ADMISSIBILITY OF DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTERESTS
INTEREST AGAINST
WHICH DECLARATION
is MADE CIVIL PROCEDING CRIMINAL PROCEEDINO
APPROACH I. Hearsay exclusion. Pecuniary/ NOT ADMISSIBLE NOT ADMISSIBLE
No exception recognized for dec- Proprietary
larations against interests. Penal NOT ADMISSIBLE NOT ADMISSIBLE
APPROACH 11.Exception with tra- Pecuniary/ ADMISSIBLE ADMISSIBLE
ditional limitation. Excludes Proprietary
declarations against penal inter-
ests - presumed untrustworthy. Penal NOT ADMISSIBLE NOT ADMISSIBLE
APPROACH III. Revision. Recogni- Pecuniary/ ADMISSIBLE ADMISSIBLE
tion that declarations against Proprietary
penal interests areas trustworthy
as declarations against other in- Penal ADMISSIBLE ADMISSIBLE
terests.
APPROACH IV. Revision. Exclu- Pecuniary/ ADMISSIBLE NOT ADMISSIBLE
sion of declarations from crimi- Proprietary
nal proceedings - presumed
high likelihood of perjury. Penal ADMISSIBLE NOT ADMISSIBLE
APPROACH V. Current Rule in Pecuniary/ ADMISSIBLE ADMISSIBLE
South Carolina. (Coleman, Proprietary
MClain and Hayes). Penal ADMISSIBLE NOT ADMISSIBLE
APPROACH VI. Modified general Pecuniary/ ADMISSIBLE ADMISSIBLE
admissibility. Admissibility of Proprietary
third party confessions under
showing of corroborating circum- Penal ADMISSIBLE ADMISSIBLE (with
stances. qualifications)
Approach I illustrates per se exclusion of all declarations against interests as inad-
missible hearsay. Approach II illustrates the emergence of a hearsay exception for decla-
rations against pecuniary or proprietary interests; declarations against penal interests,
however, are presumed not trustworthy. Under South Carolina case law, Approach II
represents the probable status of the rule prior to 1850, the year Coleman was decided.
Approach III illustrates the renunciation by some American courts (including, it is sub-
mitted, the Coleman court) of the fallacious distinction drawn in Approach II. Approach
IV makes the distinction between civil and criminal proceedings. Declarations of all sorts
are excluded from the latter type of proceeding because of the heightened threat of per-
jury. Approach V illustrates the rule in South Carolina as announced in Hayes: general
admissibility with a sole exception-declarations against penal interests in criminal pro-
ceedings. Approach VI represents the preferred approach: allowing admissibility, even in
criminal proceedings, under certain circumstances.
The Hayes opinion fails to articulate why the pertinent rules changed from Ap-
proach II (i.e., pre-Coleman) to Approach V. Again, the court failed to explain the signif-
19
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the latter view can be reconciled only by strained interpretations
of these two cases. Further, to a large extent, the latter view re-
sembles a variation on the traditional per se limitation on the
admissibility of declarations against penal interests.
While either view might be consistent with a tendency to-
ward excluding declarations against penal interests from crimi-
nal proceedings, the difference in approach is more than aca-
demic. Indeed, if the analysis proceeds from mistrust of the
substance of the declaration, then exclusion is clearly appropri-
ate absent some supplementary showing of the trustworthiness
of the statement. On the other hand, the reluctance to accept
such testimony may arise, as Dean McCormick suggested it
icance of Coleman and McClain and left at least four questions unanswered: First, did
those two cases merely change the result in civil cases directly, but not in criminal cases?
If so, under what rationale? Alternatively, did those two cases impose Approach III? Has
the current rule then been influenced by the distinction drawn in Approach IV between
civil and criminal cases? If so, why does Approach V admit some declarations in criminal
trials? The theory suggested by the first question shall be referred to as the civil case
theory; the theory suggested by the second question as the doctrinal refinement theory.
The doctrinal refinement theory probably provides a correct assessment of the sig-
nificance of Coleman and McClain. It is still necessary, however, to account for the ad-
mission of declarations against proprietary interests in criminal trials under Approach V.
Courts presumably allow declarations against pecuniary or proprietary interests to be
admitted in criminal proceedings not because that sort of declaration, assuming it was
actually uttered, is inherently more likely to be trustworthy than statements against pe-
nal interests (for it is conceded that these declarations are equally trustworthy), but be-
cause the admission of the declaration is likely to have only a minimal effect on the
ultimate determination of defendant's guilt. Indeed, a third-party declaration that is
against declarant's proprietary or pecuniary interests solely would not ordinarily be rele-
vant to the issues presented in a criminal trial. In those exceptional cases in which it
would be relevant, the admission of the declaration would certainly not summarily excul-
pate the defendant. Hence, the admission of declarations against proprietary interests in
criminal proceedings under Approach V is reasonably explained.
Under the civil case theory on the other hand, a more difficult question is posed:
assuming that the Approach II assumption of untrustworthiness of declarations against
penal interests was left intact by Coleman, what explanation is there for the exception in
civil proceedings? Unlike the declaration against pecuniary or proprietary interests in
the context of criminal proceedings, a declaration against penal interests in civil proceed-
ings may quite likely be dispositive of the ultimate issue. See, e.g., Coleman v. Frazier, 38
S.C.L. (4 Rich.) 146 (1850).
It is more likely that the doctrinal refinement theory explains the development away
from the analysis under Approach II in South Carolina. Accordingly, the reasoning of
Coleman, that declarations against penal interests are inherently trustworthy, holds true
irrespective of the nature of the proceeding. Since there is no basis for questioning the
trustworthiness of declarations against penal interests, we need to question whether the
per se exclusion is warranted in criminal proceedings. Less severe means of combating
perjury are available. See note 106 and accompanying text infra.
20
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does, 105 from a distrust of the one who provides the hearsay ac-
count of the declaration. If so, the use of conventional methods
of cross-examination, an approach far less drastic than per se
exclusion, might provide an equally effective means of combat-
ing perjury.108 Assuming that the court did not intend to under-
cut Coleman and McClain, then Hayes is not so much un-
soundly reasoned as it is needlessly overbroad.
The preferable view, consistent with the letter and spirit of
Coleman and McClain, acknowledges the inherent trustworthi-
ness of declarations against important interests, whether they be
pecuniary, proprietary, or penal. Perjured testimony may infil-
trate any proceeding;107 rigorous cross-examination is the proper
safeguarding mechanism.108 Arguably, threat of perjury is most
acute in criminal proceedings when the out-of-court declaration
is a confession that, if believed, would exonerate the defendant.
In these proceedings the court could impose a supplementary re-
quirement that the trustworthiness of the statement be sup-
ported by corroborating circumstances. This is the approach
taken by the Federal Rules of Evidence. 09
The "corroborating circumstances" requirement of the Fed-
eral Rule, however, Safeguards against the risk of perjury only in
an indirect manner. The required showing, relating to the trust-
105. C.'MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 278, at 674.
106. Id.
107. The only plausible reason of policy that has even been advanced for such a
limitation [on the admissibility of declarations against penal interests] is the
possibility of procuring fabricated testimony to such an admisson if oral. This
is the ancient rusty weapon that has always been brandished to oppose any
reform in the rules of evidence, viz., the argument of danger of abuse. This
would be a good argument against admitting any witnesses at all, for it is noto-
rious that some witnesses will lie and that it is difficult to avoid being deceived
by their lies.
5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 85, § 1477, at 358-59.
108. See C. MCCORMIcK, supra note 10, § 278.
109. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavaila-
ble as a witness:
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declar-
ant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil
or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a
reasonable man in his positon would not have made the statement unless he
believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal
liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless cor-
roborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
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worthiness of the declarant's utterance, manifests judicial reser-
vations about the declarant's veracity. The rationale underlying
the Federal Rules, therefore, entails at least a fleeting reconsid-
eration of the assumption of truthfulness when people speak out
against any of their interests. The Federal Rule requirement
does not by any means assure the truthfulness of the witness'
testimony; the requirement impinges on the in-court testifier
only to the extent that he must attribute the declaration to
someone who can otherwise be linked to corroborating circum-
stances.110 In effect, the untruthful witness is limited by the na-
ture of the lie he may tell; his perjured accounts need to be plau-
sible to be admitted.'
1 '
The Federal Rules' approach is a positive development in
the law of evidence. It embodies a reasoned consideration of im-
portant interests-safeguarding the courts from perjury on the
one hand, and affording the criminal defendant the opportunity
to exonerate himself on the other.112 Jurisdictions summarily ex-
cluding declarations against penal interests would be better
served by adoption of the federal approach. In South Carolina,
this would entail an acknowledgement of the applicability of the
Coleman and McClain rationale in criminal proceedings, com-
bined with a requirement of an additional showing of cor-
roborating circumstances.
110. Judge Weinstein has recommended that "[t]he court should only ask for sufi-
cient corroboration to 'clearly' permit a reasonable man to believe that the statement
might have been made in good faith and that it could be true." 4 J. WEINSTEIN, supra
note 98,1 804(b)(3)[03], at 804-104 (footnote omitted). See id. 804(b)(3)[03], at 804-105
to -106 (footnotes omitted).
111. If, for example, the proof is undisputed that the person confessing to a
shooting could not have been at the scene of the crime because he was in
prison, it will be excluded. But if there is evidence that he was near the scene
and had some motive or background connecting him with the crime that
should suffice.
Id. T 804(b)(3)[03], at 804-104 to -105 (footnotes omitted).
112. "The recognized danger of allowing third-party confessions to be admitted as
evidence of defendant's innocence seems to be no more ominous than the injustice re-
sulting from the refusal to allow the defendant to use every reasonable means to exoner-
ate himself." 6 VAND. L. REV. 924, 925 (1953).
Dean Wigmore observed that "any rule which hampers an honest man in exonerat-
ing himself is a bad rule, even if it also hampers a villain in falsely passing for an inno-
cent." 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 85, § 1477, at 359.
22
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B. Extra-Judicial Statements by Agents
In Addyman v. Specialties of Greenville, Inc.,113 the South
Carolina Supreme Court ruled that an out-of-court statement by
a truck driver who had been involved in a vehicular collision was
admissible in a civil suit against the driver's corporate employer.
The court found the statement to be "sufficiently close in point
of time and place so as to render it 'substantially contemporane-
ous' with the main event, ' 114 thus qualifying as part of the res
gestae exception to the hearsay rule.
Plaintiffs Peter D. Addyman and Mary Ann Addyman"5 al-
leged that defendant's employee-truck driver disregarded a stop
sign, causing a collision that resulted in injuries to Mrs. Ad-
dyman. The driver was not made a party to the negligence ac-
tion leaving the employer-corporation as the sole defendant.
Plaintiffs sought to admit the testimony of the owner-opera-
tor of a wrecker service who arrived at the scene of the collision
shortly after it occurred. Defendant's counsel objected to the in-
troduction of this witness' account of a statement allegedly
made to him by defendant's employee. The trial judge sustained
the objection and, with the jury absent, the witness' testimony
was proffered for the record:
Q: [A]fter you arrived at the scene, after Mr. Adamson [truck
driver] came over to you, what, if anything, did he say?
A: He said, "It must be too early in the morning," that he
couldn't, you know, something like, "I'm half asleep and I
didn't see her when she came over the hill."
MR. PARHAM [Plaintiff's counsel]: Your Honor, we would
offer that testimony into evidence on this crucial issue.
THE COURT: No sir, I'm not going to admit it, Mr. Parham.
All right, are you ready for the Jury?
(Jury returned to the Courtroom.) 116
On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the trial judge abused his
113. 273 S.C. 342, 257 S.E.2d 149 (1979).
114. Id. at 345, 257 S.E.2d at 151.
115. Initially, Mr. and Mrs. Addyman filed separate complaints. Mrs. Addyman
brought suit for $25,000, seeking damages for, inter alia, pain and suffering, mental
anguish, loss of income, and diminished earning capacity. Record at 11-12. Mr. Addyman
brought suit for $10,000, seeking damages for, inter alia, medical expenses and loss of
consortium. Id. at 6. The actions were consolidated at trial. Id. at 21.
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discretion by excluding the hearsay testimony; they contended
that the out-of-court declaration qualified as an exception to the
hearsay rule, both as a declaration against interest 117 and within
the scope of res gestae.1 8 The supreme court agreed that the
statement properly constituted res gestae, but did not reach the
merits of the other argument.
In holding the driver's statement admissible, the court
reached the correct result since the basis for the holding-that
the statement was a part of the res gestae-seems consistent
with controlling precedent.11  An alternative would be to admit
117. Brief of Appellant at 10-14. In the brief, appellant characterized the statement
made by the driver to the witness as a "declaration against interest by the respondent's
servant, which, in fact, would be admissible against the principle [sic]." Id. at 10 (em-
phasis added).
The apparent ease with which declarations against interests are confused with ad-
missions has been noted. Note, The New Federal Rules of Evidence and South Carolina
Evidentiary Law: A Comparison and Critical Analysis, 28 S.C.L. REv. 481, 536 n.253
(1977). The crucial distinction has been explained by Dean McCormick:
[Declarations against interests], coming in under a separate exception to the
hearsay rule, to be admissible must have been against the declarant's interest
when made. No such requirement applies to admissions. If a party states that a
note or deed is forged, and then later buys the note or the land, and sues upon
the note or for the land, obviously the previous statement will come in against
him as an admission, though he had no interest when he made the statement.
Of course, most admissions are actually against interest when made, but there
is no such requirement. Hence the common phrase in judicial opinions, "ad-
missions against interest," is an invitation to confuse two separate exceptions
to the hearsay rule and to engraft upon admissions a requirement without ba-
sis in reason or authority. Other apparent distinctions are that admissions
must be the statements of a party to the lawsuit (or his predecessor or repre-
sentative) and must be offered, not for, but against him, whereas the declara-
tion against interest need not be and usually is not made by a party or his
predecessor or representative, but by some third person. Finally, the declara-
tion against interest exception admits the declaration only when the declarant,
by death or otherwise, has become unavailable as a witness, whereas obviously
no such requirement is applied to admissions of a party.
C. McCoRnucK, supra note 10, at 630-31 (footnotes omitted).
The references to "declarations against interest," by both attorneys in the Addyman
case, Brief of Appellant at 10-14; Brief of Respondent at 6-8, illustrate the extent to
which the distinctions have grown blurred. The truck driver-declarant in Addyman was
not only available to testify, but he did in fact testify. Record at 27-50.
To the extent that the employee's statement is identified with, and thus constitutes
an admission by, the employer, the defendant in Addyman, it is regarded as an
admission.
118. Brief of Appellant at 5-9.
119. E.g., Van Boven v. F. W. Woolworth, Co., 239 S.C. 519, 123 S.E.2d 862 (1962)
(plaintiff's account of statement made by defendant's employee after plaintiff fell and
injured herself held admissible as part of res gestae); Eudy v. Atlantic Greyhound Lines,
24
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such statements as admissions of a party-opponent, but this ap-
proach properly should be effectuated statutorily.
Marshall v. Thomason120 is often cited for its enunciation of
the pertinent South Carolina rule regarding admissions of party-
opponents. Under Marshall, statements made by agents are not
received in court as admissions against the principal unless the
agent's scope of employment includes the authority to issue
statements. 121 The rationale for this rule is that "[a]uthority to
do an act ... does not of itself include authority to make state-
ments concerning the act . . ." Marshall cited a previous
South Carolina case for its combined discussion of the res ges-
tae, vicarious admission, and respondeat superior facets of the
issue raised: "If an agent commits a tort while acting within the
scope of the agency, the principal is liable, but, if he makes dec-
larations or admissions concerning it so long afterwards that
they cannot be admitted as a part of the res gestae, the princi-
pal is not bound by them.
'123
Under the South Carolina rule, out-of-court statements
made by an agent will not be admitted unless they qualify under
a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. As in the Addyman
case, admissibility is usually accomplished by characterizing the
statement as a part of res gestae.124 There is, however, some dif-
ficulty with this approach. Apart from the general semantic con-
fusion inherent in nearly every use of the term "res gestae,1' 25
Inc., 183 S.C. 306, 191 S.E. 85 (1937) (witness' account of statement by employee-bus
driver made five minutes afte the accident held admissible as part of res gestae).
120. 241 S.C. 84, 127 S.E.2d 177 (1962).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 92, 127 S.E.2d at 180 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 288(2)
(1957)). In Marshall, a statement made by defendant's employee to a police officer was
held inadmissible. The court ruled that the statement was not a representative admis-
sion by defendant because defendant's agent had no authority to make statements on his
principal's behalf. 241 S.C. at 90, 127 S.E.2d at 179. Because the statement was made
thirty minutes after the accident, the court also found that it did not qualify as res
gestae. Id. at 88, 127 S.E.2d at 178.
123. 241 S.C. at 91, 127 S.E.2d at 179 (citing Bookard v. Atlantic & Charlotte Air
Line Ry., 84 S.C. 190, 192, 65 S.E.2d 1047, 1047-48 (1909)).
124. "South Carolina has ... been rather liberal about admitting agent's state-
ments about accidents under a res gestae exception if the statement is relatively contem-
poraneous with the accident." J. DREHER, A GUIDE TO EVIDENCE LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA
112 (rev. ed. J. Thames 1979).
125. The advisability of continuing to rely on the res gestae shibboleth when admit-
ting spontaneous (or probably more correctly, "contemporaneous") utterances has been
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the election made long ago""' by practitioners and judges to rely
on the res gestae exception has produced its own legacy of doc-
trinal disorientation.
In cases involving application of the respondeat superior
doctrine, the term "res gestae" was originally used to impute the
agent's statements (as well as the acts) to the principal, not to
further any evidentiary objective, but as a matter of substantive
agency law.127 The agent's statement was considered to be part
of the agent's tortious act; hence the reference to "res gestae,"
that is, "the thing done. '128 With the emergence of the "scope of
employment" standard for determining the liability of a princi-
pal for the acts of his agent, the admissibility of an agent's state-
ments became limited to those circumstances in which the agent
had "speaking authority. 1 29 Nevertheless, references to res ges-
n.2 (1979). The survey author characterized the term "res gestae" as "one of many
chameleonic legal terms the very use of which is problematic because the term lacks
precision." Id. It was further suggested that the term be supplanted in South Carolina by
two more precisely defined exceptions to the hearsay rule enunciated in the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Id. at 79. Those two federal exceptions are found in Rules 803(1) and
(2) of the Federal Rules:
A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the
declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.
FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant
was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.
FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
The difficulties manifest in Addyman illustrate yet another sound reason for consid-
ering the codification of evidence rules in South Carolina.
126. An early illustration of the extent to which the lexicon of the res gestae excep-
tion to hearsay came to be imprecisely identified with the law of respondeat superior is
provided in Professor Story's treatise on agency. "[W]here the acts of the agent will bind
the principal, there his representations, declarations, and admissions respecting the sub-
ject-matter, will also bind him, if made at the same time, and constituting part of the res
gestae." J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY 126 (1839) (footnotes omitted).
Professor Greenleaf's classic work further illuminates this historical backdrop:
[T]he admission of the agent cannot always be assimilated to the admission of
the principal. The party's own admission, whenever made, may be given in
evidence against him; but the admission or declaration of his agent binds him
only when it is made during the continuance of the agency in regard to the
transaction then depending et dum fervet opus. It is because it is a verbal act,
and part of the res gestae, that it is admissible at all.
S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 308 (1899) (footnotes omitted).
127. See authorities cited note 13 supra. See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, §
267, at 640.
128. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 267, at 640.
129. Id.
26
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tae persisted presumably because it conveyed some vague notion
of interconnectedness between the statement and the related act
that came within the parameters of the test for principal liabil-
ity. The fact situations commonly involved accidents or other
"startling" events and thus suggested an application of the "con-
temporaneous utterance" variety of res gestae as well.
130
Whether a principal should be liable for his agent's act and
whether an agent's statement is sufficiently reliable to be admis-
sible in court notwithstanding the hearsay rule are different
questions. 131 This distinction is slighted by the traditional rule.
130. See 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 85, § 1078, at 169-70.
131. In. . . cases involving tortious liability, and, in particular, liability for in-
jury in a railway, motor, or plane accident, the question [of the admissibility of
agents' declarations] is usually complicated by the applicability of the hearsay
exception for spontaneous declarations, . . . which admits statements made
under the influence of excitement, before the declarant had "time to contrive
or invent." This serves commonly to admit the immediate statements of the
injured persons and the bystanders; and since the much-abused phrase res ges-
tae has been commonly employed to suggest the limitations of that hearsay
exception, and has also been employed (though having nothing in common) to
designate the scope of an agent's authority, it is natural that judges should
sometimes have discussed the two principles, in their application to personal
injuries, as if there were but one principle. That there are two distinct and
unrelated principles involved must be apparent; and the sooner the courts in-
sist on keeping them apart, the better for the intelligent development of the
law of evidence.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Dean McCormick was similarly critical of the traditional analysis:
[T]he assumption that the test for the master's responsibility for the agent's
acts should be the test for using the agent's statements as evidence against the
master is a shaky one. The rejection of such post-accident statements coupled
with the admission of the employee's testimony on the stand is to prefer the
weaker to the stronger evidence.
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, at 641 (footnotes omitted). Cf. Marshall v. Thomason, 241
S.C. 84, 92, 127 S.E.2d 177, 180 (1962) (Lewis, J., dissenting). "It is unrealistic, to say the
least, to hold that the driver was the agent of the employer for every purpose in connec-
tion with the operation of the vehicle, except to truthfully relate the manner in which he
operated it." Id. at 95, 127 S.E.2d at 182. Justice Lewis' artful analysis represents an
appealing departure from the troublesome common-law search for res gestae. A close
reading of his dissent, however, suggests a persistent commitment to admitting state-
ments pursuant only to a finding of speaking authority. Under Justice Lewis' construc-
tion, speaking authority will routinely be found to attend the execution of those duties
within the scope of an agent's employment; the difference then between Justice Lewis'
suggested approach and the result under the Federal Rules is purely academic. Cf. Note,
The New Federal Rules of Evidence and South Carolina Evidentiary Law: A Compari-
son and Critical Analysis, 28 S.C.L. REv. 481, 539-40 (1977) (The authors correctly indi-
cate that an application of Justice Lewis' approach and the federal rule would yield iden-
tical holdings, but their conclusion contained a minor imprecision in its statement that
27
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The modern trend, as evidenced in Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(D), 5 2
is to recognize this distinction and to avoid the confusion gener-
ated under the traditional approach. 3 3 This view admits the
statements of agents as admissions against the principal, as long
as the statement concerns a matter within the scope of his em-
ployment and is made during the existence of the agency rela-
tionship. These requirements address only the admissibility of
statements against the principal; when they are met, ample as-
surance is provided that such statements are generally reliable.
These requirements are unrelated to the ultimate assignment of
liability, although naturally similar concerns attend this latter
determination as well.
The requirement that the matter addressed in the agent's
statement be one within the scope of his employment enhances
the likelihood that the statement is reliable, since the agent will
typically have first-hand knowledge of the pertinent facts.'
Justice Lewis "advocated the viewpoint currently followed by the federal rule." Id. at
539.)
132. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D).
133. See authorities cited in 4 J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 98, 1 801(d)(2)(D)[01], at
801-159 n.2.
Under the Federal Rules, an admission generally is admissible as a "statement
which is not hearsay." FED. R. EVID. 801. Rule 801(d)(2)(D) specifically would allow ad-
mission of the type of statement at issue in Addyman: "A statement is not hearsay if
[.. t]he statement is offered against a party and is. . . a statement by his agent or
servant concerning a matter within the scope of his employment, made during the exis-
tence of the relationship. . . ." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) (emphasis added).
Admissions, to the extent that they are admissible, are admitted in most state courts
as an exception to the hearsay rule. E.g., Link v. Eastern Aircraft, 136 N.J.L. 540, 57
A.2d 8 (1948).
It is clear that in South Carolina the admissions of a party are admissible
against him as evidence of the fact admitted. Llewellyn v. Atlantic Greyhound
Corp., 204 S.C. 156, 28 S.E.2d 673 (1944); State v. Shorter, 85 S.C. 170, 67 S.E.
131 (1910). It is not clear from the cases whether admissions are considered to
be not subject to the rule against hearsay or admissible as an exception to the
rule.
W. REISER, A COMPARISON OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE WITH SOUTH CAROLINA
EVIDENCE LAW 36 (1976).
Some states have adopted evidence codes that are substantially identical to the Fed-
eral Rules. In those states admissions by agents are treated as they are under the Federal
Rules 801(d)(2)(C) and (D). E.g., ARK. UNiF. R. Evm. 801(d)(2)(iii) and (iv); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 51.035(3)(C) and (D); N.M.R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C) and (D); UTAH R. EVID.
63(9)(a); Wis. R. EVID. 908.01(4)(b)(3) and (4).
134. There is no express requirement under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) that the declarant
have personal knowledge of the facts underlying his statement. The Eighth Circuit re-
jected such a requirement in Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival & Research Center, Inc.,
[Vol. 32
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There is, of course, the possibility that an agent, due to igno-
rance or misapprehension, will make admissons that are not in
accord with the facts. Professor Falknor posited this hypotheti-
cal as follows: "Ought I not have the right to employ an exper-
ienced and skillful truckdriver, who may at the same time be a
careless, unreliable and erratic talker, without being subject to
having used against me his casual utterances made long after an
accident?" 135 The point is well taken; the counterpoint, however,
is also persuasive: "May it not be that Professor Falknor poses
the less likely hypothetical, one that may happen, but usually
doesn't? Should exclusionary rules of evidence be oriented to
the uncharacteristic cases of unreliability rather than to the
more typical ones of reliability?"13
The requirement that the statement be uttered while the
declarant continues to serve as an agent tends to ensure that the
agent has incentive not to lie. For the most part, it may be pre-
sumed that an agent would not knowingly utter falsehoods to
the detriment of his principal, though the exceptional agent who
is committed to seeing his principal held liable could circumvent
the hearsay obstacle in any event by offering perjured testimony
at trial.137 "[W]hile there is some danger here of manufactured
evidence, the [modern] [r]ule reflects the view that this would
seldom occur and that the greater vice by far is the exclusion of
valuable evidence." 138
588 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1978). Judge Weinstein terms the Mahlandt case "doubtful" and
states that a requirement of personal knowledge is implied in Rule 801(d)(2)(D) by Rules
805 and 403. 4 J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 98, % 801(d)(2)(D)[01], at 801-164 to -165 (1979).
Rule 805 reads: "Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay
rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay
rule provided in these rules." FED. R. EvW. 805.
Rule 403 reads: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless pres-
entation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. Evw. 403.
135. Falknor, Vicarious Admissions and the Uniform Rules, 14 VAND. L. REv. 855-
56 (1961).
136. Report, New Jersey Supreme Court, Committee on Evidence 165-67 (1963),
cited in 4 J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 98, % 801(d)(2)(D)[01], at 801-163. The committee
report cited endorsed the adoption of Rule 63(9)(a) of the original Uniform Rules of
Evidence, which is substantially the same as Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(D).
137. Report, New Jersey Supreme Court, Committee on Evidence 165-67 (1963),
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In Addyman, the court's holding was manifestly sound, not-
withstanding the confused corpus of common-law precedent to
which it necessarily resorted. A codified rule of evidence, ad-
dressed to the admissibility of admissions by agents and prefera-
bly modeled after Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(D), would be a com-
mendable alternative to the traditional approach; it remains for
the legislature to assume that course.
Ronald S. Matthias
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